[Introductory note from SeeingRed: The latter half of 1997--30th anniversary of the death of Che Guevara--saw a whole series of observances and discussions in Cuba, not the lest of which was the internment of his remains in Santa Clara, Cuba subsequent to a determined Cuban effort to unearth and identfy them. (Che's remains were identified using the most sophisticated scientific methods, but the absence of hands were a strong initial indicator that the identification was correct; his hands had been severed on instructions from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and were later toured by Washington internationally to prove both his death and its triumphant power.) Among the many events commenorating Che was an international conference held in Havana in October 1997 to discuss his legacy. Additionally, Tricontinental magazine, publication of OSPAAL [Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America] produced a special issue devoted to Che. In it was found an historic interview with Cuban revolutionary leader Manuel Piñiero--historic because of Piñiero^Òs tremendous stature (he was in charge of all Cuban liason with Latin American revolutionaries, and of blocking counter- revoultionary operations within Cuba--including the numerous attempts to assisinate Fidel Castro organized by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. But especially historic because Piñiero had never before granted an interview on Che. (It should be noted that despite Piñiero^Òs legendary status, he was easily reached with a phone call and regularly welcomed foreign visitors to his home.) Piñiero died in a Havana car accident March 1998 at the age of 64. [For further biographical information on Piñiero, continue to read below or go to 'Manuel Piñiero Dies in Havana'.] While this interview has also appeared in a smattering of international publications beyond Tricontinental , SeeingRed has chosen to use the translation, footnotes, and part of the introduction provided by the U.S. socialist newsweekly The Militant Further links--including to a wealth of material available here at this site--are given at the end of this interview. Footnotes also appear at the end, and are demarcated in the text by (X).]

* * * [Introductory note by The Militant: This selection is part of a series marking the 30th anniversary of the death in combat of Ernesto Che Guevara. Argentine by birth, Guevara became one of the central leaders of the Cuban revolution that brought down the U. S.-backed Batista dictatorship in 1959 and, in response to mounting pressure from Washington, opened the socialist revolution in the Americas. Che, as he is popularly known, was one of the outstanding Marxist leaders of the 20th century. In 1966 - 67, he led a nucleus of revolutionaries from Bolivia, Cuba, and Peru who fought to overthrow the military dictatorship in Bolivia. In the process, they sought to forge a Latin America-wide movement of workers and peasants that could lead the battle for land reform and against U.S. imperialist domination of the continent and advance the struggle for socialism. Guevara was wounded and captured on 8 Oct. 1967. He was shot the next day by the Bolivian military, after consultation with Washington.]

* * *

  Interview with Manuel Piñiero

A tremendous downpour broke out right as the tape recorder began. Jokes were in the air. "You're going to take my virginity away," our subject warned us, alluding to the fact that though he has met with journalists before, this is the first time in 30 years he has agreed to be interviewed about Che Guevara. He has received many requests from Cuban and foreign journalists. The reason is that Manuel Piñeiro, nicknamed "Red Beard" in the 1960s by friend and foe alike, is a key witness in reconstructing Che's entire internationalist course, from 1959 up to his murder in Bolivia in 1967. During those years Piñeiro was no less than the head of the General Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of the Interior of Cuba, which among other responsibilities, was in charge of relations with revolutionary movements in the Third World. Insurgencies were then in full bloom. Among Che's multiple tasks within the leadership of the Cuban revolution were promoting anti-imperialist solidarity and preparing himself to fight in "other lands" - efforts he devoted himself to energetically. Piñeiro worked very closely with him in this. Piñeiro earned the trust that got him this post in the Sierra Maestra primarily. He went there in May 1957 after making a request to the leadership of the July 26 Movement in Havana. Prior to that he had been one of the leaders of the Movement in his native province of Matanzas. From there he had to move to the capital, his cover blown due to his sabotage and propaganda activities. After organizing various arms shipments to the Sierra, he reached the eastern mountains. There he joined Column no. 1 commanded by Fidel. In March 1958 he passed over to the column led by Rau'l Castro, who founded the "Frank Pai's" Second Eastern Front. There Piñeiro was made head of the Territorial Personnel and Inspection Directorate, the Intelligence Service, and the Rebel Police. He ended the war with the rank of commander. He participated in founding the Ministry of the Interior in 1961, and remained there until 1975. He served almost a decade as central leader of the Technical Vice Ministry; and later, as head of the General Directorate of National Liberation. Beginning in 1975 he spent more than a decade and a half heading the Americas Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba. He has been a member of that committee since its establishment on 3 October 1965. That was the very day in which Fidel made public Che's farewell letter. Today, at 64 years of age, with his beard and hair turned gray, Piñeiro has not abandoned his preference - or custom - for working into the early hours of the morning. He does so whether in the Central Committee building, which he enters every day shortly after noon, or in the simple terrace of his home, where we are now meeting. The normal work environment of the "distinguished" individual is revealed: mounds of publications and documents on Latin America cover the furniture; at the foot of a plastic table is a lamp; there is a hammock and lush greenery in the small yard. But one also has to say that amid the intense activity as a revolutionary, he has reserved a place for family: his wife, Chilean Marxist writer Marta Harnecker; Camila, their daughter; and his eldest son Manuel, who is a lawyer. Almost four hours of discussion have gone by and he is as fresh as when he started. He has fallen short in only one promise he made, to himself above all: to be brief. But he does not have to apologize for forgetting details; his memory is as sharp as ever. He granted this interview after so many years not for himself, but as "my modest homage to Che Guevara. "

Q: When and under what circumstances did you meet Che?

A: The first time I saw him was in passing, when our columns crossed after the battle of Pino del Agua (10 September 1957). Through other combatants who had spoken of him with much respect and affection, I already knew he was a courageous and daring Argentine with a broad cultural background and solid political ideas. Later I met him again in El Hombrito, another place in the Sierra Maestra, where his command post was located. It had an armory, bakery, and medical and dental services, in which he himself was the dentist, with a pair of pliers as his only instrument. Coincidentally it was the same date as today (10 June). I had a tremendous toothache, but when I went to find Che I heard shouts and moans, and I saw him working inside a peasant's mouth, pliers in hand, extracting a tooth. I told myself I'd never allow myself to fall into that man's hands. I don't believe I'll ever forget that image.

Q: Beyond that impact, what impression did you have of his personality?

A: He gave the impression of serenity, of a great deal of self-confidence, which inspired respect. At first he could seem serious or introverted, but once personal contact was established he became very communicative, with a sharp sense of humor, often laced with irony. I believe that some comrades, with a different psychology, different cultural backgrounds, and different personal traits did not understand his jokes, saying they were "Argentine," with a very biting edge. In reality, his jokes often had a certain critical tone, but they were always courteous and educational, never meant to give offense to any comrade, always appealing to their personal honor.

Q: After the triumph of the revolution, when did you meet him again?

A: On May Day 1959 he attended the march in Santiago de Cuba, capital of the former province of Oriente. At the time I was in charge there militarily, so I met him and we held a meeting in my office in the Moncada garrison. But my close ties with Che began in the second half of 1959.

Q: Was that when you began to work together in activities connected with

solidarity with revolutionary struggles in the Third World? A: Yes. That year I transferred from Oriente to Havana, to join in founding the security and intelligence structures leading up to the creation, on June 6, 1961, of the Ministry of the Interior [MININT], which Comrade Ramiro Valde's headed. These incipient structures, and later the Technical Vice Ministry of MININT - which I was assigned to lead - were also responsible for attending to revolutionary and political leaders from other countries of the Third World, who came to learn from the experience of the Cuban revolution. Naturally, they wanted to talk to the revolution's principal leaders, above all Fidel and Che. Che made available the little time that he had, above all the nights, as he used to do with any peasant or rebel combatant in the Sierra who wanted to speak with him. The meetings with those leaders, the majority them from Latin America and the Caribbean, extended into the early morning, and sometimes to sunrise. They were held in safe houses, in Che's offices first in the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, and then the National Bank and the Ministry of Industry, and occasionally at his house.

Q: Did you participate in all of them?

A: Almost all. If not me, then some other comrade attending to the visitor.

Q: What do you remember most about those meetings?

A: Invariably they were "presided over" by a thermos of hot water, a sipping tube, mate', and a cigar in Che's mouth. I was always struck by his capacity to listen, his respect for the opinions of the person speaking, even when these did not coincide with his own views. This did not signify, however, that he didn't express his point of view, with very convincing arguments. Even without his visitor realizing it, Che could create a climate of relaxation, trust, and a fraternal spirit, which enabled both of them to speak in a direct and frank way. Although he remained on top of the political situation and the emergence of revolutionary movements in the Third World, especially Latin America, Che would read all the material we had about the political, economic, and social conditions of the country in question prior to the meetings. It was inexcusable not to have a map laid out on the table, because as a man of detail, he liked to make inquiries analyzing the geography, the topography of the territory, the characteristics of the rural population, the forms of land ownership, social struggles and their antecedents, the movements of peasants, workers, and students, the political organizations, the intellectual world. He was extremely meticulous in seeking facts and figures on these topics. In a pedagogical manner, free of schemas and dogmas, he would explain the Cuban revolutionary experience, and within it not just his own experience, but that of the other leaders, like Fidel and Rau'l Castro, Juan Almeida, Camilo Cienfuegos. He did not fail to point out to the visitor that one must take advantage of the smallest opening that existed for legal activity, but without creating illusions, keeping fully in mind the indispensable need to accumulate the maximum amount of forces, and to prepare oneself militarily to confront the repression of the popular and revolutionary movement, to the degree that it became a dangerous challenge to the ruling system. Likewise, he would warn them of the probability of an aggressive reaction by imperialism to the advance of the revolutionary struggles. Sometimes he would also enter into philosophical and cultural matters.

Q: Could you mention some of the Latin American leaders who came to make contact with him?

A: It's impossible to mention them all, but among the many, I recall the Nicaraguans Carlos Fonseca, Toma's Borge, Rodolfo Romero, and the former officer in the Somocista Army, Somarriba, who headed an attempt at armed struggle in Nicaragua -which was eventually defeated and in which Cuban comrades Omelio Herna'ndez and Marcelo Ferna'ndez died. I also recall the Guatemalans Turcios Lima, Yon Sosa, Rolando Rami'rez, Pablo Monzanto, and Julio Ca'ceres (Patojo), a very dear friend of Che's. There were the Peruvians Luis de la Puente Uceda, He'ctor Be'jar, and Javier Heraud; the Peronists William Cooke and Alicia Eguren; the Colombians Fabio Va'zquez (who would later head the National Liberation Army - ELN), the liberal guerrilla leader Franco, the La Rota brothers (founders of the Colombian Worker-Student Movement) and the general secretary of the CP in that country, Gilberto Vieira. There was also the secretary of the Uruguayan CP, Rodney Arismendi; the principal leaders of the Chilean Socialist and Communist parties, above all Salvador Allende, then a senator of the republic, and Jaime Barrios; the principal leaders of the Venezuelan CP, Fabricio Ojeda; and various Haitian and Dominican leaders. In general, all the leaders of left-wing and Communist parties of the continent who passed through Havana, met with him. It should be recalled that Che participated in the Conference of Communist Parties of Latin America, held in Cuba in 1964.

Q: Can it be said that ever since the triumph of the revolution, Cuba's policy of solidarity with Latin America began to converge with Che's idea of becoming a part of the battle for liberation in other countries of Latin America?

A: Two things should not be forgotten. As far back as History Will Absolve Me [1954] Fidel has pointed to the Latin Americanist thrust of the revolution. He himself had participated in the Bogotazo, in activities of solidarity with the struggle for the independence of Puerto Rico, for [Argentina's] sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands, for the recovery of the Panama Canal, and there was the failed expedition of Cayo Confite to overthrow the Dominican dictator Leo'nidas Trujillo. (1) In Che, Fidel met someone who already had the same determination; he was marked by the experience of the defeat of President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. (2) In that country Che met many revolutionary leaders of the continent, which strengthened his anti-imperialist and Latin Americanist feelings and convictions. The other thing to recall is that before leaving for Cuba on the [boat] Granma, Che raised with Fidel that as soon as he could be freed of his responsibilities with the Cuban revolution, and whenever the time was most opportune, he wanted to be free to join the revolutionary struggle in another country of Latin America, preferably Argentina. He was always alert to any opportunity that presented some perspective for the development of revolutionary armed struggle, such as Nicaragua, Venezuela, or Colombia. He was always interested in the possibility of being accepted as a participant in the struggles of other countries. For example, as early as 1959, Che sent a Cuban emissary with a note to the anti-Somoza Nicaraguan Somarriba, expressing his willingness to join the struggle as soon as the guerrilla column was able to create the conditions in that country. The effort failed, to Che's sorrow.

Q: How did Che conceive of the development and spread of the revolutionary struggle in Latin America?

A: His conception, rooted in the Cuban war of liberation, consisted in founding a mother column, composed of revolutionaries of various Latin American countries. Once the stage of survival was overcome, the combatants forged, the leadership cadres formed, then as this column developed and grew it would create the conditions for separating off other columns. In this way it would expand the battle to other countries of the continent; above all toward those that had united with imperialism to defeat the popular cause. As the Cuban experience demonstrated, the original guerrilla nucleus, if it were well led, would be the little motor that through political and military action would set into motion the big motor of the masses. This was the basis of the continental and anti-imperialist conception of Che on revolutionary armed struggle. It is essentially a political and military conception based on the masses, in opposition to the interpretation that reduced things to the "guerrilla foco," a view that has been attributed to Che. He spoke of an insurrectional foco rooted in the masses, not a small group of armed men who act separate and apart from the popular movement and the people in general. He also said that the guerrilla struggle could not develop in countries whose governments were the result of some form of elections, and where the possibilities of civic struggle had not been exhausted. One basic idea of Che's should be stressed: all the conditions do not necessarily have to exist before the revolutionary struggle can begin; the struggle itself can create them as it develops. Che is therefore not responsible for the oversimplifications of the Cuban experience and of his conceptions that were developed by various revolutionaries in Latin America, albeit with the best of intentions.

Q: Was Che's preference for Argentina at the root of the guerrilla effort commanded by his compatriot Jorge Ricardo Masetti in 1963? What was Che's role in that?

A: Che had known Masetti as a journalist in the Sierra Maestra. After January 1959 Masetti returned to Cuba; he carried out a few missions of support to the revolution in Algeria with the National Liberation Front (FLN). In addition he acquired some combat experience, attending military school in our country. Che then gave him the task of organizing a guerrilla column whose principal mission was to install itself in an area in Argentina along the border with Bolivia, specifically Salta, with the idea of Che himself joining as soon as a minimum of conditions was created, to use that as a base to lead the beginning of the armed struggle in Argentina. He paid special attention to the preparation of that detachment, named the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), which Masetti was to be part of together with other comrades, including the Cubans Hermes Peña (killed in action) and Alberto Castellanos, who fell prisoner and remained in Argentine jails for four years without their being able to discover his true nationality.

Q: When Masetti left for Salta he called himself "Segundo" [Number Two]. Was this an allusion to the fact that he was heading it only temporarily?

A: Yes, because Number One was Che. That's the significance of Masetti's pseudonym. Che wanted to be the initiator, but Fidel was able to persuade him to enter Argentina only after an advance group had created the conditions. In other words, Che would not be there during the most difficult and risky stage of any guerrilla movement, that of survival. During this stage the guerrilla unit depends fundamentally on its own forces. This view has its precedent in the cadre policy Fidel developed in the Sierra Maestra. He always tried to preserve intermediate leaders who stood out as heads of columns. This policy was proven correct in our war. Fidel did not want to risk a cadre of Che's experience and continental stature during the first stage of the guerrilla struggle.

Q: Nevertheless, that effort had Cuba's solidarity.

A: It was necessary to establish a base of logistical support beforehand on the Bolivian side, and several Cuban cadres were designated for this: Abelardo Colome' Ibarra (Furry), today a corps general of the army, and Jose' Mari'a Marti'nez Tamayo (Papi) who would die several years later in the Bolivian guerrilla movement. They went to Bolivia to provide assistance to Masetti and his group, with the aid of the Peredo brothers and Rodolfo Saldaña (members of the Bolivian CP), in coordination with a group of comrades we sent to La Paz. Simultaneously, on Che's request the married couple William Cooke and Alicia Eguren were responsible for support work in Argentina, even though they did not know the plans totally, nor the eventual participation of Che in that guerrilla movement. It's also necessary to recognize here the cooperation given at that time by the leadership of the Algerian FLN.

Q: Masetti's insurgency was eventually discovered and almost all its members died or disappeared. What impact did this have on Che?

A: A deeply emotional and human impact. Comrades had been killed with whom he had been tied by many years of comradeship and struggle. As he said more than once, what upset him was the idea that while this was occurring he was here sitting in an office. When contact with Masetti was lost in April 1964, Che made all possible efforts to clarify the circumstances of those events, to learn if there were survivors, and in case they existed, to reorganize them. In those efforts he had the collaboration of William and Alicia. Since then, other Argentine friends have continued looking for the remains of Masetti and his comrades, trying to reconstruct the events, but up to now they have not been able to find indications of how that guerrilla effort ended and the circumstances of Masetti's death.  

Q: During that same period, Che paid close attention to the efforts at insurgency in Peru. Is it true that this country was an alternative evaluated by him prior to selecting Bolivia?

A: Argentina, Peru, Bolivia - all of these were part of his integrated plan of advancing his strategy of a continental revolution. Parallel to the Salta operation, in January 1963 a group of Peruvian combatants led by Alain Eli'as, and among them Javier Heraud and Abraham Lamas, attempted to begin armed struggle, entering Peru through the zone of Puerto Maldonado, on the border with Bolivia. The young Peruvian poet Javier Heraud and other comrades were killed there. They had the support of various cadres of the Bolivian CP, especially the Peredo brothers, who provided them with logistical support and served as guides for their column to enter Peru from Bolivia. Years later the ELN(3) reinitiated the struggle under the leadership of He'ctor Be'jar. The guerrilla movements of Luis de la Puente Uceda and Guillermo Lobato'n, leaders of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), also emerged. Che had met with all these Peruvian leaders previously. In other words, there was a certain degree of organization and a popular upsurge. Social struggles were going on, such as the land seizures led by Hugo Blanco. At the same time Peru was attractive to Che because it was closer to Argentina. Besides, in that period a democratic government existed in Bolivia, which had arisen out of the revolution of 1952, and it lasted until 1964. However, the guerrilla effort of the ELN, as well as those of the MIR, were destroyed. Luis de la Puente Uceda was killed (in November 1965) as well as Lobato'n (in January 1966); He'ctor Be'jar was arrested in 1965 and the column he led was defeated...

Q: How did Che react to these reverses, which clearly postponed his continent-wide effort?

A: He seemed very impatient. He did not stop exploring the possibility of joining the armed struggle in other countries, such as Venezuela and Colombia. Nevertheless, favorable conditions did not exist to receive a revolutionary of his political and military stature, with all the consequences this would entail.

Q: When did he begin thinking about Bolivia as a scene of battle and not just as a zone of support? Why did he decide on that country?

A: In 1964 Barrientos carried out a coup d'e'tat in Bolivia and a period of intense repression was opened. At the same time, however, there was a movement of popular resistance, particularly by the miners and students. From that time on, Che began to watch the unfolding of events. Two years later, while he was in Tanzania, Che decided to send Papi to Bolivia to evaluate the situation. The latter confirmed Che's view that this was the only viable option, in the sense that there existed the minimum political conditions and there were experienced Bolivian cadres, who had taken part in assisting Masetti and the Peruvian guerrillas. That is, there were steeled individuals who were prepared, politically and ideologically, to give solidarity to any revolutionary movement that arose in the area.

Q: How did the Bolivian effort fit into Che's continental strategy?

A: In his view, that guerrilla effort was to have become a school for forming Latin American cadres, above all from the Southern Cone - among them Argentines - which would help extend the armed struggle to neighboring countries. At the same time, it would enable him to accumulate political and military forces and wait for the most opportune occasion to continue the struggle toward his native country. This would depend on the development and growth of the mother column established in Bolivia. Without that, it would not be possible to continue toward Argentina, where a bloody military dictatorship had also been installed, supported by the United States and repudiated by the most combative sectors of the Argentine people. In a realistic manner, Che calculated that if, beginning with Bolivia, other guerrilla columns arose and evolved, composed of combatants of various countries of the Southern Cone, this would provoke as a reaction an alliance with the governments and armies of the neighboring countries, supported by imperialism. Such a development would contribute to spreading the revolutionary armed struggle in the region, which would turn into a scene of cruel, long, and difficult battles that sooner or later would lead to Yankee intervention. It would therefore become another Vietnam, as he called for in his historic "Message to the Peoples of the World" through the Tricontinental.(4)

Q: Did the original idea and the plan for Bolivia come entirely from Che?

A: Yes, the selection of the place, the combatants, the design, and the preparation of the plan were all conceived by him. Naturally, Fidel offered all possible support and cooperation. He again raised that Che should not be part of the advance forces, but should instead go once things were in place and a minimum set of conditions had been created: logistics, weapons, an urban support network, and the incorporation of Latin American cadres, in particular Bolivians, as well as their training, adaptation to the terrain, and so on. In short, he proposed that the guerrilla movement should first pass through the stage of survival. But by now Che was eager to begin the struggle, above all in a country such as this, bordering the one he wanted to take the revolutionary battle to: Argentina. In addition, from the psychological point of view he felt very pressed by the passage of years. He knew better than anyone that there were elementary physical conditions that were indispensable for leading a guerrilla movement. He knew it would not be easy to carry out the plan at the conjuncture Latin America was then going through, with the United States undertaking the demobilizing Alliance for Progress, and the whole counterinsurgency campaign of supporting the regimes of the area, which it supplied with arms, financial resources, and military training. They wanted to prevent at all costs the spread of the Cuban revolution's example.

Q: It has been said that after publication of his farewell letter, Che felt he had made a moral commitment not to return to Cuba, or not to take on a visible post again in the leadership of the revolution...

A: In my opinion, with or without a farewell letter, Che's plan was unalterable. He was determined to fulfill what he had laid out as his historic and strategic objective: to spread the anti-imperialist struggle throughout the continent.

Q: If we discount Ciro Bustos, only one Argentine remained in the Bolivian guerrilla movement, Tania. What do you think was the explanation for the almost insignificant presence of Argentines there?

A: Bustos was a liaison who had a series of connections and relations given him by Che, so that contact could be made with Argentines of different organizations and brought to the zone where he was operating in Bolivia. After Bustos was taken prisoner and turned informer - offering information and drawings identifying Che and the guerrillas - Argentina was "frozen." Remember too that when the army discovered the guerrilla base, the whole plan unfolded in an accelerated way. The guerrilla unit had to stay on the move constantly, and at that stage it became very difficult to maintain contact with the urban base and contact with those outside the country. Had this not occurred, I believe, then when Che's presence in Bolivia became known, many cadres and combatants from various revolutionary forces on the continent would have looked for a way to come and participate. Che's call to action exerted a great influence on many revolutionaries inside and outside Latin America.

Q: What merit is there to the story spread around the world that Cuba's political leadership abandoned Che in Bolivia and did not provide him the support necessary for the success of his operation?

A: From the very beginning of the Cuban revolution - and much earlier, going back to our first wars of independence - the empire has practiced a strategy of trying to divide the revolutionary forces. First it circulated the story that the disappearance of Camilo was the result and consequence of differences within the revolutionary leadership;(5) later it spoke of supposed differences between Rau'l and Fidel; and later between Fidel and Che. In this way it mounted a whole campaign of disinformation that has lasted up to the present, to try to sow confusion not only in Cuba but in the Latin American and world revolutionary movement, and in international public opinion. One of the centerpieces of these campaigns is the supposed abandonment of Che's guerrilla movement, which is based on questioning why we didn't send military reinforcements to support him and to help him break the Bolivian army's encirclement. Anyone who knows the laws of guerrilla warfare is aware that in the initial and most difficult phase, the guerrilla column is compelled to be on the move constantly to avoid the ambushes of the enemy army, especially if it is at a disadvantage. In such a phase, the guerrilla unit depends on its own forces and the backing it can receive from the urban network, which at that time had been hard hit. Therefore, it would not have been such an easy task to send - to use their term - military reinforcements. It's pure fantasy.

Q: And is it also a fantasy to compare, as has been done, the supposed lack of support to Che with the successful Cuban efforts to get its officers out of Venezuela?(6)

A: With absolute knowledge and responsibility I can state that in Venezuela the Communist Party, the MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left], and other revolutionary forces, although they had suffered some defeats, maintained clandestine structures and operational facilities that helped make possible the patient and meticulous organization of the operation to get these comrades out. Those circumstances did not exist in Bolivia.

Q: Returning to 1965, you were very closely involved in the preparations of the Cuban internationalist mission in the Congo led by Che that year. In your judgment, what did that stage represent for him in relation to his final strategic plan?

A: At that time, although there was certainly a revolutionary upsurge on a world scale, headed by the heroic Vietnamese people, and under the impact of the Cuban revolution, nevertheless the minimum conditions for Che to materialize his plan in Latin America still did not exist. Based on this, and on the request for aid that had been made of Cuba, through Che, by the leadership of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of the Congo, Fidel proposed that the most useful thing Che could do was to head up the group of Cuban military advisers who would be heading off to that African country. The aim would be to allow Che to gain time while accumulating experience, getting himself ready again, and at the same time preparing some of the Cuban cadres and combatants who would accompany him later to Bolivia. Che viewed the Congo stage as a stepping stone, an intermediate phase to prepare himself for his definitive goal. There he would wait for the evolution of developments in Latin America to create favorable political conditions to carry out his strategic plans. So much so that as he was leaving the Congo, Che asked Harry Villegas, Carlos Coello, and Jose' Mari'a Marti'nez Tamayo if they were willing to continue the struggle together with him, in another country, a struggle that would be long, complex, and difficult. These comrades were later part of the Bolivian guerrilla movement under the pseudonyms of Pombo, Tuma, and Ricardo.

Q: What was the role of the vice ministry you headed in the delicate operations to get Che and his comrades to Africa, later return to Cuba, and then go to Bolivia?

A: Our department was in charge of the entire technical and operational preparation for the Congo mission, supplying the documents, travel itineraries, and false identities. Starting with our embassy in Tanzania, we constituted a support group in charge of seeking information and cooperation in the shipment of logistics from that country to Che's base in the Congo, the training of the radio operators, as well as other forms of contact and communication with Che. On Fidel's instructions, the Technical Vice Ministry of the Ministry of the Interior gave support to Che on everything he requested in relation to the future mission in Bolivia. We supplied the documents, the false passports, the information he requested on various situations in Bolivia, the training in different specialized areas, such as communications and conspiratorial methods. All the technical details were prepared by our officials, but each step was analyzed and approved by Che: the routes chosen and who would take them; how to pass unnoticed through airports, airport characteristics and border checks, the thoroughness of immigration checks, at what times and on what days was there less vigilance by the authorities. Toward this end a study was made on the operational, border control, and immigration situation, and the methods applied by the counterintelligence forces of the countries Che and the other combatants would be passing through. Some day, at the right moment, this story will have to be told in more detail, and recognition given to the comrades who worked on that operation, and not a single name will be omitted. More than 140 Cubans went to Africa, and more than 20 to Bolivia, without being detected by the organs of Yankee espionage, nor by the security apparatus of the countries they were passing through. The work was carried out with great meticulousness, professionalism, strict division of labor, and above all with great motivation since it involved Che and those who accompanied him. We lived through those days in great tension; I'm speaking for the entire team in charge of these tasks. We knew that a single error of any type could cost the life of a participant in the mission. These were hours of anxiety and permanent vigilance, until we received confirmation of the arrival of Che and the rest of the group at their destination. I will never forget those moments, nor will any of the comrades who carried out that difficult internationalist task in anonymity.

Q: What was Che's frame of mind in the months between his return from the Congo and his departure for Bolivia? He came from a defeat in Africa ...

A: A defeat whose causes he explained, making a self- criticism besides, as he was accustomed to doing given his personality and standard of ethics. But one must always remember that he went to the Congo to transmit his experience and to advise, not to lead that war of national liberation. Once he was there he came up against the cultural and religious traditions, the differences among the Congolese leaders, the lack of combat experience. Psychologically this was a very difficult situation to confront, above all for our combatants who were steeled in battle, with experience of struggle, and who wanted not only to advise but to participate in direct combat against the enemy. It was not easy, understandably. For that reason, Che directly took part in combat, and was prepared to accept the final consequences of his acts. Nevertheless, the decisions taken by the Congolese leadership and by the governments of Africa created a conjuncture where there was no alternative but to organize his departure from the Congo and that of all the other comrades. With respect to Che's morale before leaving for Bolivia, he was like a child with a new toy. He was euphoric, happy, because he was with the group he had selected, and by then they had already been trained. He acted in a very fraternal manner with the comrades, although he was also very disciplined and demanding. They followed a plan of rigorous physical, military, and psychological training; reading of documents on that country, learning the Quechua language, mathematics classes. He was very much concerned with raising the cultural level of the combatants under him.

Q: In April 1967, when Che was already in Bolivia, a supplement to our magazine published his "Message to the Peoples of the World." Nevertheless, according to some versions, this was not written in Bolivia but in Cuba. What can you tell us about this?

A: I believe that's basically correct, that he wrote it during the time he was at the training camp in Pinar del Ri'o province, before his departure for Bolivia in November 1966.

Q: It's noteworthy that while he devoted so many intellectual and practical efforts at internationalism, he didn't attend the historic Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, held in January 1966. What was the reason?

A: He couldn't attend because while the Tricontinental Conference was being held, he was in Tanzania. But while there he received all the materials and an assessment of the meeting.

Q: What was the impact on you of Che's farewell letter?

A: I already knew of it before it was read by Fidel in the presentation of the first Central Committee of the Communist Party in October 1965. Nevertheless, every time I hear or read it, I'm deeply moved and it brings back many memories both of Che and of his comrades, since I knew all of them and had close personal and working ties with some of them.

Q: The last time you saw Che alive, did you think it would be the last time?

A: I saw him in the early morning hours of the day he went to the airport to go join the guerrilla struggle in Bolivia. It was in a safe house where he held, I believe, his last conversation with Fidel. Rau'l Castro and Vilma Espi'n were also there. Fidel and Che were sitting on a sofa, talking there by themselves, in low voices, for a very long time. I didn't think this would be the last time I would see him, although those of us involved in this type of struggle know that in it one either triumphs or dies. We were very optimistic, and very confident in the determination, will, and capacity of Che, of the Cubans who accompanied him, and of the Bolivians, who had proven themselves in other tasks, to attain their objective and be able to deal capably with all the difficulties they would encounter. In reality, the Bolivian guerrilla movement was able to carry out a number of successful military actions, inflicting casualties on the army's soldiers and taking prisoners. Che did not have a mystical view of death, as has been attributed to him. Had he survived alone or with another combatant he would have tried to reorganize the guerrilla unit and continue the battle. He was not a man to give his life easily to his enemies, nor did he have an inclination to be a martyr. Proof of this is that even when he was wounded and his rifle put out of action, he tried to escape from the encirclement to meet up again with his men. He never felt defeated or demoralized. He defended his ideas with his own flesh and blood, unconcerned about whether he might give his life in the effort.

Q: Did Che say goodbye to you? What kind of farewell was it?

A: He did so in the safe house I mentioned. He was happy, smiling. He was finally heading off to his long-awaited goal. It was a simple farewell; he was not very effusive. Che carried his emotions inside himself; one had to know how to decipher them. But as always, the expression on his face transmitted great force and conviction.

Q: How did you learn of Che's death?

A: By a radiophoto I received on October 10, where Che's body was shown in the hospital laundry room. I called Fidel and he came to my house. I remember Fidel's expression, one of doubt. He saw some resemblance to Che in the photo, but was not completely convinced it was him. He headed home, and he was there with Comrade Celia Sa'nchez when I brought him a second radiophoto I'd received, which left no doubt it was Che. That moment remains etched in my memory like a photograph that I'll never forget. There was a great silence in the house. Fidel sent Comrade Celia to find Aleida, Che's wife, who was conducting research in the Escambray mountains, to give her the news personally. He then called other comrades in the party leadership and began to give instructions on how the news should be transmitted, and to prepare our people for the harsh news. It was a tremendous blow. But on those revolutionary missions, one leaves one's life under one's pillow.

Q: How long after that did you learn there were survivors?

A: Shortly afterward, when Pombo, Urbano, and the now- traitor Benigno succeeded in breaking the encirclement, and when Inti Peredo, in particular, established contact with some members of the Bolivian Communist Party and the ELN [National Liberation Army] who took them to the Chilean border. I always remember with great affection the role played by Salvador Allende, at the time president of the Chilean senate, who despite criticism from the right wing, offered his full support and protection to the three survivors. He informed our ambassador in France, Baudilio Castellanos, that he would accompany the three survivors to Tahiti. Our ambassador flew there, and brought them to France, and then to Cuba. Equally, the collaboration offered by the Chilean Communist and Socialist parties should be noted, as well as that of Beatriz Allende and many other comrades, among them the journalist Elmo Catala'n, who would later die in combat together with Inti Peredo, trying to reinitiate the armed struggle in Bolivia.

Q: Recently you were able to read the testimony of the Chilean Manuel Cabieses, published in the magazine Liberacio'n, about the arrival of Che's diary in Cuba. What is your opinion of it?

A: It's very objective. Cabieses is a serious journalist, rigorous in his analyses and journalistic works. In addition, he is a very consistent revolutionary, with a fraternal attitude of solidarity to Cuba and revolutionary movements in Latin America. This question reminds me of the participation of various comrades in the publication of the Diary in other languages: the Italian Feltrinelli, a friend of the Cuban revolution and an admirer of Che; the Frenchman Francois Maspero; Arnaldo Orfila, of Siglo XXI in Mexico; and the staff of the magazine Ramparts in the United States. Also the publishers in other countries who, under the coordination of Rolando Rodri'guez, then-president of the Cuban Book Institute, made an extraordinary effort to publish the Diary in Cuba and the entire world before the U.S. secret services could publish a falsified version, as they wanted to. That battle was won.

Q: What is your opinion of the biographies of Che that have recently appeared?

A: I have not read them all, although I have seen some comments published in newspapers in Latin America where one of these biographies in particular tries to present Che as purely a cultural symbol, above all among the youth, stripping him of his political and ideological message and of his example. Some - because not all of them present a negative balance sheet - emphasize that all of Che's economic, political, and military ideas have failed, that they are out of date, and that the road taken by the Cuban revolution has gone against his ideas. In my opinion, if the Cuban revolution had abandoned Che's ideas, it would not continue being - as it is - a bastion of anti-imperialist and anticapitalist struggles that are taking place in the world, and of the fight for socialism. Even in the difficult circumstances of economic, political, and ideological aggression by imperialism, the Cuban people maintain the heroism Che summoned them to, and that they are summoned to every day by Fidel, who Che called his "teacher and guide." The proof that the ideas, thought, actions, and example of Che have not failed and that they project the future, is that there is an ever growing and conscious interest both in Cuba and the world to study and interpret his works, recovering the essence of his ideas and analyzing the differences between the historic moment he lived in and the present. In many countries, the consumer societies have sought to turn him into a piece of merchandise. Nevertheless, the image and example of Che rises above these attempts, much to the discomfort of the triumphalists of neoliberalism and the powerful in this world. To try to reduce him to a cultural symbol is a vulgar simplification. I do not believe that the attraction and solidarity he evokes today among young people around the world, within the revolutionary movement, and in progressive and democratic sectors of the world are a result of this narrow perception of Che's legacy. Rather, they see him as a man with tremendous moral force, very honest, sensitive, human, capable of acting on his ideas, as a symbol of internationalism and anti-imperialism, of solidarity, of genuine socialism. In short, Che is seen as an example for the current and future generations, who will see in him a banner of revolutionary intransigence, of moral values, of social justice. I believe that as long as there are oppressed and oppressors, social injustice, and imperialist domination, and as long as there is also hope for a just and fraternal world of solidarity among human beings and peoples, the ideas and example of Che will endure. Therefore I agree with what Fidel said on October 12, 1987, at the event commemorating the 20th anniversary of the death in combat of Che and his comrades, "Che is more alive than ever, has more influence than ever, and is a more powerful opponent of imperialism than ever."

_____________

Footnotes: 1)The Bogotazo was a popular uprising in Bogota', Colombia in 1948. Castro was in Bogota' to help organize a Latin American student congress, and he participated in the uprising. In 1947, an expedition was organized from Cuba to overthrow the Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic. It was aborted when the expeditionaries were dispersed by the Cuban army at Cayo Confite. Fidel Castro was a participant. 2) Seeking to crush political and social struggles in Guatemala accompanying a limited land reform initiated by the regime of Jacobo Arbenz, mercenary forces backed by the CIA invaded the country in 1954 to oust the government. Arbenz refused to arm the people and resigned, and a right- wing dictatorship took over. Among those volunteering to fight the imperialist-organized attack was Ernesto Guevara, who had been drawn to Guatemala by the upsurge in struggle there. 3) National Liberation Army of Peru. 4) Guevara's "Message to the Tricontinental," written in 1966, called for creating "two, three ... many Vietnams." It is printed 5) Camilo Cienfuegos was a Rebel Army commander who became chief of staff in January 1959. He died October 28, 1959, when his plane was lost over sea. 6) In 1967 several leading Cuban volunteers were in Venezuela, assisting in the armed struggle against the U.S.- supported regime in that country. Most were able to return to Cuba after the guerrillas were defeated.  

_____________

For a 12-issue subscription to the print edition of The Militant, send US$10 to 14 Charles Lane, New York, NY 10014. Visit the website for information on international rates.

_____________

    home     |     subscribe     |     talk     |     help-about     |     back issues     |     resources