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Habibie Regime Behind Anti-Chinese Violence by Max Lane (reprinted from Green Left Weekly [Australia], original source unknown) As rioting and looting spreads to more provincial towns in Indonesia,
there is a growing danger that these outbreaks may be transformed
into anti-Chinese riots.
During the last 30 years, social and economic frustration amongst
Indonesia's poor has regularly flared into riots. Almost inevitably,
the main street of provincial towns would be burned down and shops
looted.
Chinese-Indonesian shopkeepers, whose premises dominate these
streets, have suffered most in these outbreaks, even where there
has not been a conscious or specific targeting of Chinese people.
During many riots, the graffiti and chants of the rioters have
been aimed at the government or the rich in general, not the Chinese.
At the same time, however, relations between Chinese Indonesians
and non-Chinese Indonesians have been strained for a long time
(see accompanying above).
The situation began to worsen in 1997. The worst instance of planned
attacks on the Chinese community occurred during the May 13-14
riots.
In some locations in Jakarta, certain Chinese-owned businesses
and houses were marked beforehand. Organised groups of men attacked
and burned these places, often with people still inside. The brutality
extended to the organised gang rape and murder of Chinese-Indonesian
women.
The need by the New Order ruling class for scapegoats has intensified,
especially as the economic crisis has deepened this year.
Regime officials began a thinly veiled attack on Chinese big business
in January, with speeches referring to "rats" who have
taken their money overseas just when the country is in crisis.
This was followed by a speech by the head of the KOPASSUS commando
forces, General Prabowo, on January 14 at a meeting of conservative
Moslems. He blamed the economic crisis on a political conspiracy
organised by big capitalists who "henchmen operated from
overseas".
Associated with these attacks was the increasingly frequent refrain
that Chinese controlled 70% of the Indonesian economy.
This is a ridiculous claim given the overwhelming dominance of
transnational capital and the business operations of the Suharto
family and other Indonesian families. But it has gained some currency
because of the prominence of several large Chinese-owned business
conglomerates, and because Chinese-owned shops in provincial towns
are very common.
The Habibie regime is now trying to take advantage of the current
disruption of the Chinese-owned provincial wholesale and retail
sector, the distribution system for many commodities. Under the
guise of promoting cooperatives, the government is providing all
kinds of facilities to non-Chinese capital to take over the distribution
of many commodities.
This is causing even greater havoc. Many of the newly appointed
distributors are hoarding products to force up prices and make
a quick profit. Far right
While the regime confers legitimacy on the attacks on Chinese,
even more sinister forces have become better organised.
The first group to carry out political activities clearly aimed
at the Chinese and Christian minorities, as well as attacking
the left, was the ultra-right Moslem group Committee for International
Solidarity for World Islam (KISDI).
KISDI is the "international solidarity" wing of the
Dewan Dakwah Indonesia (Indonesian Preaching Council). The Dewan
Dakwah is the most conservative Moslem grouping in Indonesia and
claims continuity with the 1950s anti-Communist Moslem political
party, Masyumi. Sections of Masyumi were implicated in an ultra-right
military mutiny launched in Sumatra and Sulawesi in 1957 and backed
by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Until May, KISDI had worked closely with Prabowo. KISDI forces
tried to give credibility to Prabowo's claim of a political conspiracy
by targeting the Catholic Chinese businessman Sofyan Wanandi.
In February, protest actions were organised outside the Centre
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which was closely
linked to Sofyan Wanandi.
Meanwhile, Prabowo's security operatives attempted to link Sofyan
Wanandi with the People's Democratic Party (PRD), issuing statements
that Sofyan Wanandi was financing the PRD. This was a bizarre
claim as CSIS is a right-wing institution which has regularly
issued its own warnings against the PRD as a "dangerous left-wing"
force.
The Dewan Dakwah's publications are full of attacks on three targets:
the Chinese, with thinly veiled attacks on "unpatriotic business"
and calls for more assistance to indigenous business;
"Christianisation";
and communism, including attacks on the PRD. These are also the
major themes in Dewan Dakwah sermons and speeches in the network
of mosques and prayer houses that it controls.
Key figures from KISDI have now joined with other extremist Moslem
organisations to form a new ultra-right political party, the Crescent
and Star Party (PBB).
The PBB competes with two other parties in claiming a continuity
with the old Masyumi. One is a small new party, New Masyumi, which
has little real support. The second is the National Mandate Party
(PAN), headed Amien Rais.
Rais initiated negotiations with KISDI figures about joining the
PBB, indicating his willingness to accommodate to the PBB's racialist
politics. The negotiations broke down when PBB leaders refused
to agree to work with more moderate Moslem leaders.
Since Prabowo's downfall, the PBB has cut its links with him.
However, Prabowo retains links with other ultra-right gangs, often
organised through martial arts groups. It is these groups which
opposition forces in Jakarta believe Prabowo used, along with
soldiers, in the attacks on Chinese during the May riots.
Prabowo's intervention was intended to direct the mass frustration
at collapsing living conditions into hatred of the Chinese rather
than into challenges to the regime itself. The danger is that
the PBB-style forces, and Prabowo and his gangs will try the same
thing as the situation worsens. The Habibie regime's thinly veiled
attacks on the Chinese only makes this more likely.
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